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ABSTRACT 
 
The way governance structures and control instruments are designed (Adler & Borys, 
1996) and enacted in strategic alliances can influence the development of such relationships. 
Controls can become coercive or enabling depending on how they are designed and used 
(Jordan & Messner, 2012). We draw upon the framework of coercive and enabling controls 
introduced by Adler and Borys (1996) to illustrate the changes in control orientations over 
time in tandem with some other developments in a particular case study (a long term 
outsourcing contract) regarding the management of facility services. Our analysis suggests 
that the key-persons (those who represent their organizations in a strategic alliance) and their 
ways of working are influential in generating a coercive or enabling orientation in control 
design and use. The chapter highlights how unexpected changes in key persons shaped control 
orientations over time. More specifically, it is shown how a change in key persons influenced 
the design and use of controls into an enabling direction. Such a change turned a relationship 
without commitment into a trusting relationship between committed parties. However, as a 
consequence of yet another change in key persons, the relationship successively turned into a 
relationship dominated by coercive control and power. The field study suggests that the key 
persons’ respective ways of working (subcultures) can have implications for the way controls 
are designed and used. Importantly, the processes of contracting and execution of controls are 
critical in the development of governance in strategic alliances.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Most of the research on strategic alliances has stressed the relationships of control, 
trust and risk (e.g; Das & Teng, 1998; Das & Teng, 2001). Both control and trust have been 
suggested to be instrumental in absorbing uncertainty and behavioral risks (e.g; Dekker, 2004; 
Emsley & Kidon, 2007). The way governance structures and control instruments are designed 
(Adler & Borys, 1996) and enacted in strategic alliances can influence the development of 
such relationships. Control can become coercive or enabling depending on how it is designed 
and used (Jordan & Messner, 2012). 
In a case study we draw upon the framework of coercive and enabling controls 
introduced by Adler and Borys (1996). Most of the research that uses Adler and Borys’ 
(1996) framework, examined intra-firm settings (e.g. Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Chapman & 
Kihn, 2009; Jordan & Messner, 2012; Jørgensen & Messner, 2010; Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008). However, we address coercive and enabling controls in an inter-firm setting, studying 
the way they unfold over time in one and the same outsourcing relationship. Similar to Jordan 
and Messner (2012) we observe a change in control orientation over time. In their field study, 
evaluation pressures and inflexibility in dealing with incomplete performance measurement 
system changed the control orientation in a specific organization from enabling to coercive 
(Jordan & Messner, 2012). Our study, however, is not about control within organizations, but 
about control across organizations, thus responding to Free’s call for contributions to 
knowledge as to what factors lead to different control orientations across organizations (Free 
2007).  
According to Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework, coercive controls are designed in 
such a way that they coerce managerial effort and compliance; they constrain and punish 
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rather than support cooperative behavior. They are instrumental and have disciplining 
consequences. Conversely, enabling control systems allow managers to repair the formal 
system when something unexpected happens, have a clear internal logic and are globally 
transparent, that is, managers have clear insights in the organizational consequences of their 
work. Enabling controls aim to improve collaboration by information sharing and joint efforts 
for mutual benefits. They have relational consequences, and they are related to a trusting 
atmosphere. They encourage learning behavior and continuous improvement.  
Adler and Borys (1996) view ‘coercive’ and ‘enabling’ as systems characteristics. We 
adopt the suggestion put forward by Free (2007) and Jordan and Messner (2012) that 
‘coercive’ and ‘enabling’ are characteristics of design as well as of interaction. In our case 
study we focus on the interaction between different managers from two different 
organizations. 
We investigated the development of controls over time in a long term outsourcing 
relationship regarding the management of facility services. In the beginning of the 
relationship the key persons established an enabling orientation towards control through 
processes of (re)contracting and through the way control was practiced. The(re)contracting 
process helped both organizations to repair the formal control system and the practicing of 
control allowed for flexibility where the deviations from standards were discussed; both 
organizations aimed to work together for mutual benefits. The enabling orientation towards 
control produced trust between both organizations. In a later phase, after a change in the key 
persons in the outsourcing company, this orientation turned into a coercive one. When the 
new key persons arrived, contract re-negotiations and control practices were geared towards 
disciplining rather than cooperation. The new key persons brought power asymmetry to the 
relationship. According to them the performance measures that were in use before they 
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arrived were useless and did not reflect the performance of the other party. The flexibility of 
the outsourcee organization was limited. There were no attempts to repair the system because 
it was considered futile.  
Our analysis suggests that the key-persons (those who represent their organizations in 
the strategic alliance) and their ways of working are influential in generating a coercive or 
enabling orientation in control design and use. The change in key persons influenced the 
design and use of controls into two different directions. The key persons within the 
outsourcing organization had alternative views and ways of controlling (sub-cultures) which 
they had inherited from different institutional backgrounds. Their institutional rationalities 
were influential in changing the control orientation- enabling or coercive. This is also 
consistent with Ahrens and Mollona (2007) who observed different ways in which workers 
conceived of and talked about their work and its control in two different shop floor groups in 
Sheffield steel mill. Finally, it is suggested that the contracting process through which control 
is (re)designed appears to be of significance in the governance of strategic alliances. To a 
substantial extent, it is through interaction in (re)contracting processes that either a coercive 
or an enabling orientation of controls is enacted.  
The chapter is organized as follows. First, it will briefly discuss the theoretical 
background of the chapter. Next, the research methodology is explained and the field study is 
presented. Then theoretical implications are discussed. Finally, the last section provides some 
overall conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF COERCIVE AND ENABLING CONTROLS 
 
Whereas prior studies emphasized formal controls’ role to ensure predictability and 
reduction of opportunism by constraining and/or incentivizing individuals (e.g. Vosselman & 
Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), we acknowledge that formal controls may also play a role in 
promoting cooperative behavior and flexibility. In this section we discuss two different types 
of control orientations by drawing upon the framework of Adler and Borys (1996).  
 
Coercive and enabling controls 
 
Adler and Borys (1996) argue that the positive or negative impact of 
formalization/controls on the employees depends on whether formalization enables employees 
to better master their tasks/functions or it is a means by which management attempts to coerce 
employees’ effort and compliance. In their research on the design of equipment technology 
they identified two different types of controls- enabling and coercive. According to them 
equipment can be designed with a fool-proofing and deskilling rationale, aiming to reduce 
reliance on more highly paid, highly skilled, and more powerful workers (Perrow, 1983) or it 
can be designed with a usability and upgrading rationale, aiming to enhance users’ 
capabilities and to leverage their skills and intelligence. Their research into equipment design 
suggests four generic features that distinguish coercive controls from enabling controls. These 
four key features are repair, internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility. If the 
users of the formal system are allowed to repair it in case of breakdown or problem, such a 
system is enabling because such a system facilitates responses to real work contingencies and 
problems become opportunities for improvement. If managers fear opportunism from 
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employees more than potential contribution to deal with breakdowns they would design 
systems in a way that it does not allow repair. Internal transparency means that 
managers/users are able to see through and understand the logic of the systems. Such systems 
provide users with an understanding of the underlying theory of the process by clarifying the 
rationale of the rules. For example, the budgeting process can be integrated with operational 
planning activities and it would enhance internal transparency (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). 
Global transparency refers to the intelligibility for the employees of the broader system with 
which they are working (Adler & Borys, 1996). It is the understanding of their work as 
compared to a broader picture of the organization. For instance, the budgeting process can 
make the organizational processes globally transparent if it increases managers’ 
understanding of the firm’s strategy and operations (Chapman & Kihn, 2009). A formal 
system has flexibility if it allows some elasticity in terms of its use and helps managers to 
better manage their work. It encourages users to make modifications to suit their specific 
work demands. For example, a process control system for product development would be 
flexible if it gives guidelines that can be adjusted to suit an individual development project 
(Jørgensen & Messner, 2010). 
In case of a coercive control orientation the controls induce disciplined actions, whereas 
in case of an enabling control orientation the controls entail (inter)actions by empowered 
people and have collaborating consequences. Coercive control is closely connected to the 
assurance of predictability and the reduction of opportunism in a relationship. Control is 
experienced coercive when it generates disciplined behavior by the parties involved. Control 
is enabling when it induces intentional interaction between parties to achieve common goals. 
A coercive orientation is characterized by the use of power; there is control over rather than 
control with (Adler, 1999). In order to reach predictability in the relationship, a party is 
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constrained in its actions and is incentivized to forego self-interested opportunistic behavior. 
On the other hand, an enabling orientation invites interactive dialogue, views problems as 
opportunities, fosters trust, capitalizes on and learns from mistakes. An enabling orientation 
facilitates problem solving while a coercive orientation frustrates two-way communication, is 
autocratic, sees problems as obstacles, fosters mistrust, suspects differences, punishes 
mistakes and fears the unexpected (Hoy & Sweetland, 2001). In a coercive orientation, there 
is much monitoring. 
The distinction between coercive controls and enabling controls has proved to be useful 
in prior control studies (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Kihn, 2009; Free, 2007; 
Jordan & Messner, 2012; Jørgensen & Messner, 2010; Rooney & Cuganesan, 2013; Wouters 
& Wilderom, 2008). These studies observe that the distinction between coercive and enabling 
depends on the design and implementation process. The enabling control systems can help 
managers to be flexible while fulfilling the top management’s efficiency objectives. For 
instance, Ahrens and Chapman’s (2004) field study of a restaurant chain found that enabling 
uses of control systems allowed committed managers to contribute to both efficiency and 
flexibility. The design and development process of the control system is important. For 
instance, if a performance measurement system is developed with managers’ involvement in 
the design and development process, it contributes to an enabling nature of performance 
measurement system (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Most of these studies were undertaken in 
intra-firm settings with the exception of Free (2007). The argument put forth by Free (2008) is 
that the hierarchical, asymmetrical relations, manager interaction, and information sharing are 
important co-conditions of coercive and enabling uses of accounting (and control) and these 
features exist in many buyer-supplier relationships (or strategic alliances).  
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In the context of an interfirm transactional relationship (an alliance), particularly for 
enabling controls to be effective the key persons would have to participate in the design and 
implementation of the controls (Wouters & Wilderom 2008). By participating in the design 
and implementation, they would understand the purpose and the logic of the system and they 
would understand the wider organizational implications of their work. However, we agree 
with Jordan and Messner (2012) that the focus on design, implementation and use is 
somewhat static. We argue and illustrate through a case study of an alliance that the shaping 
of coercive and enabling control is neither a matter of system design, nor a matter of rational 
choice only. The shaping of coercive and enabling control is not simply a matter of 
negotiating control structures and incorporating them in a governance structure (a contract). 
Rather, coercive and/or enabling orientations in control emerge through ongoing interactions 
between key persons representing the organizations in an alliance. These interactions may 
take place in more or less formal contract negotiations between the organizations that are part 
of the relationship, but also in everyday operational activities. Key persons then shape and 
enact controls in ongoing processes of interaction. It is, we claim, through the processes of 
interaction that a coercive or enabling orientation of controls unfolds. Also Free (2007) comes 
to conclude that open book accounting and performance measurement are neither 
collaborative nor disciplining by design. Rather, they become collaborative or disciplining 
through the way they are enacted. Free (2007) describes two different case studies wherein 
one inter-organizational control was coercive and in the other it was enabling and each 
orientation was reinforced by accounting information and techniques. But it still remains to be 
explored which factors influence enabling or coercive orientations in the context of interfirm 
relationships (Free, 2007). Therefore, this chapter tries to explore the development of controls 
in a single interfirm relationship over time. 
10 
 
 
 
 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The research is a qualitative field study/ case study. Our aim is to contribute to theory 
by positioning field data against the theory of control in alliances (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). 
We draw upon the data from a specific case study in reaching our conclusions (Lukka & 
Modell, 2010). Theory is an input for understanding the practice and it is also an outcome. In 
this type of study, the researcher is part of the process of knowledge production and uses 
literature as well as field data to draw conclusions. To a researcher the task is not simply to 
describe something as given but to analyze it in a specific context. Thus the qualitative field 
study is not simply empirical but a profoundly theoretical activity which is shaped by the 
theoretical interests of the researcher (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006).  
The primary sources of data were general meetings, semi-structured interviews and 
documents. The data were collected in two rounds (June 2008-April 2009 and June 2010- 
November 2010). The purpose of the general meetings (4 meetings) was to get access to the 
field and to share the results of the first round of interviews with the case organization. The 
feedback from the first round of interviews was helpful in further examination of the data. It 
also helped us in devising more focused questions for the second round of interviews. The 
semi-structured interviews were one of the key sources of data. The questions during the 
interviews inquired different control mechanisms that were being used to steer the 
relationship and how they were used. We also asked questions about the development of the 
interfirm relationship over time. The duration of the interviews was between 1 and 1 ½ hours 
and we did 19 semi-structured interviews in two rounds with the managers of different 
organizations involved in our field study. The managers held diverse functional positions (for 
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instance, facility management, purchasing, finance & accounting, manufacturing and account 
managers) at different hierarchical levels (country manager, department heads and operational 
managers). Several documents were also collected and analyzed. The documents included 
service level agreements (SLAs), roadmap documents (monthly meeting documents), 
quarterly reports, organization charts and a power point presentation. The documents were 
important in identifying contradictions, inconsistencies or confirmations with the interview 
themes. For instance, the review of quarterly reports gave us the description of the 
performance and the status of the interfirm relationship and this was compared with the views 
expressed by different managers during interviews. The documents also enabled us in making 
tables and diagrams, and in extracting contextual information. 
For the purpose of data reduction we used both deductive codes (derived from the 
theoretical frameworks) and inductive codes (themes emerging from the participant’s 
discussions) (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). The transcripts were coded and analyzed by 
using the qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti. The software not only helped us in 
coding but also facilitated management and organization of data for further analysis. We 
followed three important steps in data analysis, that is, data reduction, data display and 
conclusion drawing / verification (Miles & Huberman, 1994; O'Dwyer, 2004). Informal 
meetings, lengthy argumentations and reviews among research colleagues was important in 
refining the conclusions of this chapter and the conclusions are the result of an intersubjective 
consensus among researchers (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
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FIELD STUDY  
 
The parties  
 
In order to maintain confidentiality pseudonyms are used for the organizations involved 
in this study. This field study is about a long term outsourcing relationship between a Client 
Firm (CF) and a Management Firm (MF). The relationship concerns the outsourcing of the 
management of facility services by CF to MF. 
CF is a leading semiconductor company founded by Parent Firm (PF) more than 50 years 
ago. It is headquartered in Europe and listed on NASDAQ. The company had about 29,000 
employees working in more than 30 countries and posted sales of USD 5.4 billion (including 
the Mobile & Personal business) in 2008. CF creates semiconductors, system solutions and 
software that deliver better sensory experiences in TVs, set-top boxes, identification 
applications, mobile phones, cars and a wide range of other electronic devices. CF is a 
multinational company having its operations and customers in different countries in Europe, 
Asia and North America. In the Netherlands, the company is located at two sites, that is, the 
production site and the headquarters. 
MF is an Anglo-Dutch organization, located in the Netherlands. This organization 
possesses specialist knowledge of and has experience in the provision of management 
solutions for facility services, appropriate for both public and private sector clients. The 
company strives to become the market leader in the European Total Facility Management 
(TFM) market. MF is a joint venture between a UK-based company and a Netherlands-based 
company. It was founded in 2002 and it currently has various ongoing multi-million euro 
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contracts with international companies located in the Netherlands. Its first substantial contract 
was with PF. 
 
The nature of the relationship 
 
MF has a managing agent contract with CF. It does not provide facility services itself. 
There are multiple suppliers that provide facility services and the contracts for facility 
services are negotiated and signed directly between CF and different suppliers. MF only 
supervises and manages the contracting and delivery of facility services. Hence, MF manages 
the relationships between CF and multiple suppliers of CF. This makes the relationship a 
triangular one as shown in figure 1. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Although the suppliers’ roles are also considered, the primary focus of the study is on 
the relationship between CF and MF. The contract between CF and MF is about the 
management of facility services for two sites in the Netherlands, that is, the production site 
and headquarters. Some examples of facility services provided by suppliers and managed by 
MF included building and environment related services (e.g. fire prevention system, heating 
ventilation and air conditioning, safety, utilities management, etc.), office services (e.g. 
cleaning, reception, parking, data management, office supplies, etc.), projects (capital works, 
space management and relocations), communications and hospitality (e.g. catering, 
conferences, event management services, etc.) 
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Some services are highly repetitive (e.g. building and environment and office services) 
and some are less repetitive (e.g. hospitality). So, there is a mix of service transactions with a 
relatively high frequency. A service provider is called an integrated service provider 
(Ventovuori, 2007) if it provides a package of different facility services. In this case MF is an 
integrated service manager and not an integrated provider because MF is managing the 
contracts between CF and multiple suppliers and not directly providing facility services.  
CF does not outsource the management of all the facility services. In CF, facility 
services have two categories. One category includes facility services for offices and buildings 
(as described above), whereas the other category includes facility services for core operations 
performed in the production departments called ‘fabrication units’ (FABs)1. The contract 
between CF and MF relates only to the management of facility services for the offices and 
buildings (called soft services). The department within CF responsible for the soft facility 
services is Real Estate and Facility Management (RE&FM) Netherlands and the department 
responsible for the facility services of the core operations (called hard services) within the 
semi-conductor fabrication plants (called FABs) is called FABs-Facility Management (FABs-
FM). The management of hard facility services requires technological knowledge and is 
critical to the primary manufacturing processes. The management of the FABs-FM 
department has not (yet) been outsourced to MF. Facility services for FABs are managed in-
house. As far as there are contractors involved in FABs facility services, they are supervised 
and managed by the CF’s own engineers and staff and not by MF. The services handled by 
FABs-FM include piping, chemical supplies, gases, maintenance of cleaning room, and green 
                                                 
1 FABs become important during the case study and it will be presented later in the description of the case. 
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filling drums. FM in FABs is governed in-house because FABs facility services are critical to 
the production of semi-conductors and if FABs close down for any reason there would be 
huge losses. 
  The terms of the transactional relationship between CF and MF are written down in a 
contract and in service level agreements (SLAs). The Real Estate and Facility Management 
(RE&FM) department is responsible for the relationship between CF and MF. The head of the 
RE&FM department in the Netherlands reports to the Country Manager Netherlands in 
coordination with purchase manager. Furthermore, there are two facility managers for two 
different sites located in two different cities. These facility managers report to the head of 
RE&FM. One site is the production site and the other site is the headquarters of CF. The 
facility managers at site 1 and 2 also deal with MF on an operational level. The suppliers 
provide the soft facility services at both sites and MF is responsible for the management of 
soft facility services at both sites. MF is involved with CF at different hierarchical levels 
through its managers such as an account director, a facility and contracts manager and a 
senior facility manager. Now we describe the development of the relationship over three 
different phases in the next sections. 
  
Phase I: The start of the relationship: a lack of a mobilizing force  
 
In the beginning the relationship between CF and MF was not working well. An 
important reason for this was that the initial four-year contract (signed in May 2006) was not 
negotiated between CF and MF but between MF and PF (parent firm). At that time CF was a 
business unit of PF called PF Semiconductors. The original decision to enter into the 
relationship with MF was not made by an autonomous CF but by PF, particularly PF Real 
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Estate Management and Services. The business unit PF Semiconductors itself was not 
engaged in the contract negotiations.  
PF’s decision to outsource the management of facility services was mainly driven by top 
management’s strategic consideration that the focus should be on core operations and that 
non-core operations should be outsourced as much as possible. Moreover, PF’s decision to 
outsource the management of facility services to MF in particular was closely related to PF’s 
prior positive experience of outsourcing to MF in which PF transferred 60 employees to MF 
and reaped good financial benefits by outsourcing of another part of its operations. In case of 
PF Semi-conductors (became CF later), the local management did not participate at all in the 
decision and the contract negotiations; the contract was just handed over to them by PF. For 
example a facility manager expresses it as follows: 
“It seemed to be an agreement between a few people whereas there were numerous 
stakeholders at the site who didn’t feel involved at all in that process”. 
In September 2006, PF Semi-conductors was sold to a group of private equity 
investors and CF came into existence. In its early stage the relationship between CF and MF 
did not work properly because most of the managers in CF, including the country manager, 
were against the earlier decision to outsource the management of facility services to MF. 
Local management was not properly involved in the outsourcing decision and in the contract 
negotiations, and as a consequence they behaved uncooperatively. PF’s top management 
decided on outsourcing, partner selection and contractual agreement. Therefore, the controls 
written down in the contract were not effective and did not provide adequate motivation for 
everyday activities; a commitment which is necessary for the development of a transactional 
relationship. CF’s employees were unwilling to cooperate and to coordinate with MF. This 
was also, partly, due to an improper alignment of interests between the parties. For instance, 
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the purchase manager at CF pointed out that the incentive to improve was very low for MF 
because contractually, in case of savings, CF would get the most of the savings (80%), 
whereas MF would get a meagre benefit (only 20%). Moreover, the managers experienced a 
lack of detail, clarity and comprehensiveness in the original contract. The Manager RE&FM 
described the problems with the contract as follows: 
“And if you look at savings, savings are always a nice issue; who initiated it? Who is 
responsible for the results? Who gets paid for it? And if you don't make that very clear you 
will always have discussions and cooperation becomes very difficult. So that was one big 
problem with the previous contract.” 
The unwillingness to cooperate was first and foremost due to the absence of CF’s 
managers in negotiating and designing the contracts with MF. The relationship could not 
develop because the absence of CF’s management in the contracting process did not provide 
an opportunity for the formation of positive expectations of future behavior in the 
relationship. At the start of the relationship, the control structures were neither enabling nor 
coercive. The structures hardly had any mobilizing potential. They did not function as 
incentives or safeguards, and neither did they have the potential to build trust as a mobilizing 
force. Thus, there was a contract between the two companies but there were problems with the 
design in terms of structures (such as clarity in the contract) and use of those structures that 
appeared in the form of the lack of cooperation and coordination.  
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Phase II: The development of an enabling control orientation through new key 
persons, re-contracting and control practices 
 
Some important organizational changes took place in CF in the beginning of 2007- a new 
managing director as well as a new head of RE&FM arrived in the CF. The managing 
director, the manager RE&FM and the Purchase Manager became important key persons in 
the relationship. Given the problems with contract and lack of commitment from the parties, 
they concluded that the original contract had to be revised. They started contract re-
negotiations. The efforts of these new key persons were a stimulus for a positive change in the 
interfirm relationship because they started dialogue and interaction with different stakeholders 
(internal customers in CF and the managers of MF) in the outsourcing relationship. 
CF re-negotiated the contract with MF. The essence of the contract revision (the re-
contracting process) was the sharing of views and the creation of a willingness to cooperate 
rather than safeguarding against opportunistic behavior. The re-contracting process allowed 
the managers to discuss control and communication structures thereby creating a trust 
building atmosphere. The sharing-attitude and communication were guiding the contract 
revision as explained by the Purchase Manager: 
 “In 2007 we said we needed to revise the contract because the contract is material in how 
organizations interact and behave. Contract steers the behavior of people, it steers the 
behavior of organizations. There were certain aspects in the old contract which were 
contradictory to a good relationship and a good execution of the things in the contract”. 
So the re-contracting process was a vehicle that mobilized the parties in the 
outsourcing relationship. It was the basis for launching a change in control orientation 
because the managers who had to deal with the relationship were part of the design and 
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development of contract and control practices. This way they could also improve clarity in the 
contract especially in terms of responsibility and incentives. The re-contracting process also 
resulted in the codification of new control structures that were aimed at incentivizing MF by 
aligning its interests with CF’s interests. The parties agreed to include an incentive-penalty 
structure in the contract. The managers mutually agreed on a new incentive-penalty structure 
that was perceived as a necessary base for cooperation and partnership rather than as a 
safeguard of private interests. According to this incentive-penalty structure, the parties agreed 
to share savings equally (instead of old ratio of 80% allocation to CF and 20% to MF) if 
savings would be above targets. 
Also, after the arrival of the new key persons the way control structures were enacted 
changed. Both parties would mutually agree on the targets and were committed to them. For 
instance, the country manager stressed that they were working in a partnership where they 
would define targets and responsibilities together and share the fruits of their efforts. The 
important thing was that both during the re-contracting process (in the beginning of 2007) and 
in the period immediately before and after the revision of the contract there was a high 
frequency of coordination, communication and information sharing between CF and MF at 
different management levels. The parties developed and formalized a meeting format in the 
interfirm relationship during 2007 in which the frequency of formal interaction was weekly, 
biweekly, monthly, quarterly, six-monthly and yearly. This frequent interaction made the 
relationship more effective and durable. MF also set up help desks at both sites. However, in 
the beginning of 2008, the format of the meetings was altered. It was agreed to decrease the 
frequency of the meetings because both organizations had reached a reasonable level of 
maturity and trust. They agreed to only one monthly review meeting, called a road map 
discussion, and a quarterly review. The road map meeting/discussions turned out to be an 
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important control device. In monthly meetings, the managers would discuss problems, share 
information and develop joint plans and strategies to resolve issues and bring improvements. 
The manager RE&FM describes that in the road map meeting they would not only discuss 
short term situation but also the strategic direction of the relationship. 
In case there was a low score on any Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), managers 
from both companies would discuss and share the reasons and jointly charter the way to 
improve those specific KPIs. But the managers explained that most of times the KPIs were 
above the targets. After the contract revision the relationship between the two companies was 
no doubt in a better shape. It had become a relationship in which trust was growing and trust 
was influencing the development of the relationship. There was a discussion between both 
organizations on expanding the scope of outsourcing. As described earlier, CF owned the 
contracts with the various service suppliers, whereas the management of the delivery of the 
services was done by MF. But due to the improvement in the interfirm relationship the 
managers started to talk about the possibility of Total Facility Management (TFM) in which 
MF would handle both the operational management of facility services and the contractual 
part with the service suppliers. In other words, CF would get one contractual partner (MF) 
instead of many. 
Considering the state of the relationship between CF and MF, the country manager 
(managing director) of CF communicated that they had a trusting relationship and they were 
discussing the possibilities for extending the scope (towards TFM) of the outsourcing 
relationship. The extension was also beneficial for MF because they could get leverage and 
better deals from the suppliers of services. They could use similar supplier for different 
customers. Although to CF this extension would imply a higher dependence on MF, and, thus, 
a higher risk of potential future opportunistic behavior by MF, CF managers expected 
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economic benefits from TFM because they trusted MF’s competencies and intentions. The 
manager RE&FM was benevolent towards MF and he believed that MF had the right to make 
money. According to him, that CF and MF would keep each other informed about their 
strategies and plans. This exhibits that they intended to stay together for a long period of time 
and roadmap meetings were used to exchange communication and stay on the same page. 
Other managers at CF also voiced that they had a trusting relationship with MF.  
MF was operating a transparent open book system to show its commitment to the 
relationship and its willingness to act cooperatively in the interest of the relationship. Any 
manger from CF could log into that system to see the state of affairs. Different formal 
(contractual) sets of activities were used to govern the relationship. There were formal 
controls in place, in the form of cost saving targets (objectives) and a result-oriented incentive 
system. The open book system was also part of the formal control. The enactment of formal 
controls in the form of regular roadmap discussions, the joint development of business cases, 
the setting of targets and the sharing of savings shaped a sharing and collaborative attitude to 
the relationship. Furthermore, MF was facilitating CF in producing good business cases and in 
reducing costs as described by one manager of MF: 
“We know CF is in bad weather and problems are going worse. So we said ok no problem at 
all we can take over some more activities. Similarly, last year, we made some extra money on 
organization costs and we said keep the money. We don’t need it but we put in some extra 
employees.” 
It is to be noted that there were some talks about developing new KPIs because 
existing KPIs were considered ineffective. But ineffectiveness of the KPIs was not an issue 
and they were trying to develop new KPIs mutually.  
22 
 
 
The case study suggests that the re-contracting process and the design and practicing of 
formal controls gave a positive turn to the development of the interfirm relationship. The 
contract was important in this regard but key persons voluntarily agreed about additional 
formal controls and increased transparency. The managers tried to align the interests but 
safeguarding behavior was not a key driver in the contracting and practicing of controls. They 
considered that building a stable and cooperative relationship was important for the 
relationship. Formal controls were enacted in an enabling way, thus producing trust. KPIs 
were instructive and conducive to learning. Incompleteness or effectiveness of the KPIs was 
not a big issue. The key persons were talking about developing new KPIs because over time 
existing KPIs were not that effective. They were talking about developing new KPIs with 
mutual discussions. The change of the key persons and their role were a noticeable factor in 
the development of the relationship.  
 
Phase III: A change in key persons and the emergence of a different control 
orientation 
 
Some organizational changes took place in the middle of 2010. First, the CF’s country 
manager (managing director) left because he was diagnosed cancer and a new country 
manager was appointed who was also responsible for CF’s real estate and facility 
management operations worldwide. Secondly, the hard and soft facility management 
departments at CF merged into one facility management department. Thirdly, the manager 
RE&FM was fired and another manager with a background in FAB facility services (hard 
facility services related to the manufacturing operations) was appointed as head of RE&FM. 
Fourthly, the old contract had expired in 2010 and new contract negotiations were in progress 
23 
 
 
when the second round of interviews started. All these changes and, in particular, change of 
key persons, had a substantial effect on the alliance.  
The negotiations in the re-contracting process were tough because the new key persons at 
CF had an alternative view of the relationship. They did not seem to be interested in trust as 
much as their predecessors. They wanted to have a relationship that they termed as a ‘business 
relationship’. The new managers had a background in the FABs facility services. Their 
expertise was in facility services in an environment where there was a strong focus on costs, 
control and detailed information. They called it the ‘FABs culture’. In addition, because of 
their training and experience in industrial facility services they always compared MF’s work 
with their industrial standards, and they expected MF to be more proactive. In FABs the 
proactive attitude is critical because huge losses could result due to delay. 
New CF managers were dominant during the contract re-negotiations. MF was giving in 
to their demands and dictations because the new key persons possessed specialist knowledge 
of (technical) facility services and suppliers highlighted weaknesses in the abilities of MF. 
The competences of MF and, thus, its trustworthiness were openly questioned. The new key 
persons from CF used the word trust very sparingly and were critical of previous managers’ 
ways of working with MF. MF had to provide more and more information and CF was more 
powerful in the alliance. MF’s managers now talked about trust as something that was missing 
in the relationship and, according to them, the orientation of the control in the relationship 
turned tough/coercive after the arrival of the new key persons. According to MF’s managers 
there was a breakdown of trust but CF’s managers, however, stated that trust was not very 
relevant because it was a ‘business relationship’. 
The new key persons of the CF had doubts about the competencies and the intentions of 
MF and they did not see the possibility for an expansion in the scope of the contract. They 
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questioned MF’s intentions because they thought there was no open discussion on the part of 
MF. Regarding competency/ability of MF, some of the suppliers managed by MF raised 
concerns about MF’s abilities and value in the relationship. They disclosed the weaknesses in 
the performance of MF. CF’s new managers were somewhat opportunistic and they were 
trying to get maximum commercial benefit out of the contract negotiations by asking for a 
lower price and threating MF that they would do tendering where other companies could also 
compete for the contract. MF managers shared information but did not have positive relational 
expectations and had a fear of opportunistic behavior by CF. Despite having an almost four 
year’s old relationship, CF’s managers were asking for more and more information. This 
destroyed MF’s trust in the relationship. For example, MF’s senior facility manager feared 
that CF might sign a contract with another party: 
“The way in which we are treated by CF in the sense that they posing questions and more 
questions and more questions and more questions, I sometimes think they want it all from us 
in the knowledge sphere and they might say in the end, thank you for everything and we are 
going to do it ourselves or they could use the information for a tender.” 
The new country manager explained that a controlling culture prevailed with the new 
key persons, particularly the FABs subculture. The managers working in the FABs (the new 
key persons) had a tendency of controlling in a coercive way. Having worked in FAB-FM for 
many years these managers had internalized the FAB culture. A cost focus and tight control 
were the characteristics of FABs culture. The same way of working (to have tighter control 
and require more information) of CF’s new managers was experienced by MF’s facility and 
contracts manager of MF because of his interaction with those key persons as follows: 
‘‘Because of the change to FAB facility management, the new managers are detail-minded 
and now we have different meetings such as an incident meeting, review meetings, cost saving 
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meetings. Previously, there was one meeting, once in a month or once in a quarter and then it 
was okay. Perfect. There’s more control now than it was with the previous RE&FM.” 
The views of the suppliers of CF regarding the tendency towards tighter control at CF 
(new managers from FABs) were similar to the views of MF’s managers. The new key 
persons wanted to have complete insights of the activities performed by MF and different 
suppliers. 
The questioning and criticism of the ability and the integrity of MF and coercive use 
of contracting and controlling processes led to a decrease in trust. The new key persons 
succeeded in establishing a more coercive use of controls. The institutional background (prior 
experiences of FAB subculture) of new managers as well as insights provided by the suppliers 
resulted in a ‘business relationship’ rather than a ‘partnership relationship’. The new 
managers installed a way of controlling that was already institutionalized in FABs facility 
management. 
One of the reasons why CF’s new key persons had power over MF was that they had 
expert knowledge because of their FAB facility management background. They had high 
standards of performance and they expected MF to attain those quality standards along with 
cost reduction. For instance following quote from the contract manager of MF explains how 
the new key persons compared their FABs FM (technical FM) with the work of MF (Office 
related FM) and expected them to perform like their own organization (FABs):  
"My engineers can do it better as a facility management organization, you know. So, that’s 
now always the struggle and we are always competing with them and showing them, okay, we 
know what we do and, look, we know what we do because of this and it’s really much more 
detailed information that we have to provide. That’s really a funny change.They have a focus 
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on one thing and we have the focus on another thing. They always make it a mirror of their 
own organization because of the switch they made in their own organization.”’  
CF also had concerns about MF’s performance and the parameters used to measure 
that performance. According to the new key persons, CF’s previous managers and MF had 
been managing the performance through metrics (KPIs) but the internal users within CF were 
not satisfied with the performance. According to the new country manager the existing 
performance measurement system was flawed and it looked professional from outside only. 
He added that the internal customers would not respond to the customer satisfaction survey 
(one of the measures of MF’s performance) and would not give complaints to a computer 
system. As a result he thought the performance measurement systems did not represent the 
reality. 
The changed environment and developments (as mentioned above) in the alliance 
weakened the power of MF in the contract renegotiations. CF managers were in the driving 
seat and were dictating MF managers. Perhaps, because of the expectation that it would 
succeed in writing a new contract with CF, MF yielded to the power of CF. For instance, 
MF’s senior facility manager described that they yielded to the demands of CF despite the 
indication by CF that MF was not the only available party. The negotiations were tough for 
MF. The new management of CF desired both a higher quality and a reduced price.  
To sum up, a power asymmetry in the alliance emerged after the arrival of new key 
persons. CF openly expressed its bargaining power. New key persons were experienced in 
FAB facility management. Coming from the FABs, they represented a culture that employed 
strict control and hands-on way of controlling. To the new key persons, trust was a trivial 
thing in this relationship. But MF manager thought it was an essential thing. Moreover, CF’s 
negotiating power increased by challenging (supported by the service suppliers) the 
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performance management systems based on KPIs. Whereas the performance measures and 
measurements produced a track record of competence and integrity, for the old key persons, 
in the two years 2007 and 2008, to the new key persons the KPI’s did not reflect real 
performance of CF. Therefore the key persons at CF did not value the existing performance 
measurement system. Perhaps, out of economic interests or because of their expectation that, 
in the end, CF would stay in the relationship, MF gave in to the demands of CF. 
 
 DISCUSSION  
 
The field study points out that the operation of control within an interfirm context is 
complex and dynamic. The study demonstrates that accounting and control tools and 
technologies such as open book accounting, (re)contracting , performance measurement with 
KPIs and regular meetings/reviews can be enacted in enabling ways so that both organizations 
gain, learn and develop together. However, the same tools can be enacted in coercive ways, 
where one organization is more powerful in contract negotiations and performance meetings 
and the dominant party tries to gain better deals and even prefers using ‘hands on control’ 
outside the formal performance measurement system. The four design characteristics (repair, 
internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility) distinguished by Adler and Borys 
(1996) have been linked to the predominant features observed over time in the field study in 
table 1. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Enabling uses of accounting and control 
 
The values, norms and agency of key persons are reflected in the developments in the 
long term outsourcing relationship over time. Being representatives of each of the partner 
organizations, key persons process information in the interfirm relationship (Aldrich & 
Herker, 1977; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Noorderhaven, 2009; Perrone, Zaheer, & McEvily, 
2003). Key persons operate at least at two levels: the operating level and the institutional 
(contractual) level. The initial award of the contract to MF by PF was done by corporate key 
persons. They based their decision on their strategy to save costs and to focus on core 
operations, on their own prior experience with MF, and on MF’s reputation as one of the 
market leaders. PF’s corporate key persons concluded and signed the contract, and handed it 
over to the operating key persons (i.e. local management of PF Semiconductors). The 
operating key persons did not participate in the contracting process. As a consequence, local 
management was not sufficiently mobilized to cooperate and failed to further build structure 
in the relationship; controls were neither perceived as coercive nor as enabling, but were 
inactive and perceived as inadequate. As the original contract was not the result of local 
management’s agency, the relationship could not properly develop. 
Only when new key persons entered CF, both organizations renegotiated the contract. 
The re-contracting process and development of KPIs were meant to repair the governance of 
the alliance. The managers were motivated and committed because they were part of the 
process of contracting and development of performance measurement system. The 
involvement of the managers in the development process (experience-based) contributed to 
enabling nature of the formal control system (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). This re-
contracting process also enhanced internal transparency because of the clarity in the roles and 
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responsibilities of both parties. Joint forecasting and mutual development of business cases 
also improved internal transparency. Global transparency was enhanced by sharing the 
strategic priorities and forecasting the ways to develop. The control devices such as KPIs, 
roadmap meetings, quarterly and yearly reviews were used to discuss issues. The mutual 
development and enactment of controls as well as open communication and discussions 
during the meetings exhibit flexibility and enabling uses of control. The meetings were used 
as opportunities for learning and continuous improvement. The formal accounting and control 
practices stemming from the new contract helped building trust because the use of KPIs was 
instructive and conducive to learning. The dominant internal logic was costing saving, sharing 
and growing together. This enabling enactment of controls mobilized the parties and affected 
the level of trust. The trust increased to such a level that an extension in the scope of the 
contract was seriously discussed. The underperformance in the KPIs would be discussed and 
key persons from both organizations would mutually find out reasons and ways to improve 
the performance. They were also talking about developing new KPIs that would better reflect 
the performance because some KPIs were not effective after some time because of changed 
circumstances. But this incompleteness of KPIs was not a big problem. The controls (KPIs, 
roadmap meetings, quarterly reviews and yearly reviews) were designed and used to aid 
decision making rather than to control opportunistic behavior of the partner organization. 
 
Coercive uses of accounting and control 
 
Another change took place when, again, new key persons from CF (FABs) arrived. They 
came from a different (FABs) subculture and had alternative views on the relationship and its 
control. They did not appreciate the use of KPIs as something that reflected MF’s 
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performance. They challenged the trustworthiness/ representation of performance measures 
(KPIs), and chose not to trust the numbers. The new key persons did not work towards 
repairing the existing controls but they preferred ‘hands on control’ outside the performance 
measurement system. According to the new key persons, MF was not working efficiently and 
proactively. The re-negotiation of the contract was taking place in an atmosphere of distrust 
and fear for opportunism, and the controls practices became rigid and disciplining (less 
flexibility). As the dominant internal logic was cost reduction and profit maximization the 
new key persons saw negotiation as an opportunity to gain from the deal and discipline MF. 
CF collected more and more information from MF and was threatening to tender to another 
party. There was a one way flow of information. The meetings and communications were 
means of discipline and action, and new key persons demanded adherence to their own ways 
of working (FABs culture). The new key persons desired more and closer monitoring, a 
higher quality and a reduced price. From its part, MF accepted all the demands by CF. But the 
formal control oriented towards disciplining and safeguarding (coercive control) entailed a 
decrease in trust in the eyes of MF. However, CF persisted that trust had nothing to do in that 
situation. There was power asymmetry and CF was ‘dictating’ MF. The new key persons 
made the relationship a hierarchical in which there was high internal transparency (because of 
their technical facility management background and some suppliers’ nagging about the 
ineffective role of MF in managing some facility services) but limited flexibility. The new key 
persons employed ‘hands on control’ and contract re-negotiations in a way that enhanced the 
accountability and gave them a get better commercial deal. As a result of this changed 
orientation MF’s key persons were experiencing frustration and distrust. 
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Key persons’ sub-cultures 
 
Our field study shows change in control orientation over time in a specific 
interorganizational relationship in response to change in key persons. So control orientations 
may change over time as suggested by Jordan and Messner (2012) but the change in control 
orientations in this study is due to the key persons who came from different institutional 
backgrounds. The managers of CF who have experience and expertise in office related facility 
services drew upon accounting and control tools in enabling ways but the managers coming 
from FABs background and experience had internalized a specific culture of controlling and 
they used controls in coercive ways. This field study identifies an important factor which may 
influence the enabling or coercive uses of accounting in the context of alliances/supply 
chains. This factor is the norms and values (culture/sub-culture) of the key persons. In the 
FABs-FM department the culture of focusing on cost and coercive control was highly 
institutionalized. This resonates with Ahrens and Mollona (2007) who note that control is a 
cultural practice. The new key persons also had expert knowledge in the management of 
FABs facility. During the contracting processes and the practicing of control this knowledge 
provided them with expert power. It is suggested that the norms and values (for instance the 
FABs culture) and the expertise of the key persons are important in how the relationship and 
controls develop. 
 
  Accounting for control 
 
Accounting has a decision facilitation function as well as a control function (Jordan & 
Messner 2012). The new key persons considered the control system (especially the KPIs) as 
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‘professional from outside’ but did not think that the KPI system fitted a right way of doing 
business. The KPIs did not help CF’s managers in controlling the other party (MF). They 
found that the MF performed well on the KPIs but still they were not satisfied with the 
performance. The representational quality of performance measures (KPIs) was challenged.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This study reinforces that change in control and in control orientations is strongly 
influenced by changes in the managers and their institutional backgrounds; particular 
experiences and expertise (see also Rooney & Cuganesan, 2013). This field study responds to 
calls for research into the evolution of control in supply chains (e.g. Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; 
Free, 2008; Gulati, 2010). The (unexpected) developments in an alliance and particularly 
changes in key persons embed changes in control orientations. A change in key persons may 
turn a relationship that lacks mobilizing forces into a trusting relationship with an enabling 
use of controls, and subsequently as a consequence of yet another change in key persons that 
trusting relationship may then turn into one in which power dominates and control becomes 
coercive. The experience, norms and values of key persons seem to be essential in mobilizing 
parties in either an enabling or a coercive orientation of control. 
It is suggested that more field studies should be undertaken. The interfirm relationship 
studied in this paper has a specific context and history, particularly regarding change in the 
management or key persons. It would be interesting and useful to study the renegotiation of a 
contract without a change in management or in a different institutional context. We also 
suggest field studies of renegotiation of contracts in the long term interfirm relationships in 
which partner firms have high stakes (asset specificity). 
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Table 1: The coercive and enabling framework of the field study (Based on Free, 2007) 
Characteristics Definition Dimension Old Key persons New Key persons 
Repair Capability Systems tools and orientation 
towards repairing damage in the 
alliance. 
Rational Tone Trusting atmosphere; 
smoothing 
Opportunistic 
atmosphere; forcing 
Type of learning Double loop learning 
with adaptation; dynamic 
view of knowledge 
Single loop learning; 
static view of rules, 
procedures and policies 
Role of (road 
map) meetings 
and quarterly 
reviews 
Opportunity for learning 
and continuous 
improvement; flexible  
Rigid, disciplining, 
opportunity for control 
Internal 
Transparency 
The manner in which 
functionings and status of control 
practices are made clear to actors.  
Negotiation 
focus 
Integrative  Distributive 
Dominant 
internal logic 
Cost savings and sharing; 
growing together 
Cost reduction/profit 
maximization 
Global 
Transparency 
The visibility of the overall 
context in which actors from both 
organizations perform their 
specific duties 
Information 
sharing 
Proactive involvement 
from MF, joint problem 
solving, forecasting and 
development of business 
cases. Sharing of 
strategic priorities.  
Collection of data from 
MF and threatening to 
tender to another party; 
one way flow of 
information  
Nature of 
organizational 
boundaries 
Permeable Rigid 
Flexibility  Choices over modes of operation 
and customization 
Performance 
measures and 
meetings 
Performance measures 
and meetings are 
instructive and conducive 
to learning. Problems are 
discussed and mutually 
acceptable ways are 
adopted. 
Performance measures 
considered not 
representational. 
Meetings and reviews 
are target of discipline 
and action 
Customization of 
implementation 
The relationship involved 
adaptation to the 
relationship; heavy focus 
on building a long term 
relationship 
 
The management of CF 
services requires 
adherence to 
predetermined methods 
(ways of FABs) and 
power asymmetry 
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Figure 1: The relationship triangle 
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